The Heterogeneity Among Commodity-Rich Economies: Beyond the Prices of Commodities by Troug, Haytem
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Heterogeneity Among
Commodity-Rich Economies: Beyond the
Prices of Commodities
Haytem Troug
university of Exeter
14 February 2019
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/92599/
MPRA Paper No. 92599, posted 11 March 2019 13:24 UTC
The Heterogeneity Among Commodity-Rich Economies:
Beyond the Prices of Commodities
Haytem Troug∗
March 8, 2019
Abstract
The existing literature has always assumed that commodity-rich countries are a homoge-
neous group, resulting in the generalisation of any findings obtained from a single commodity-
rich economy. This paper proposes a small open economy model for a commodity-rich country
and studies the triggers of business cycles for four different commodity-rich economies to high-
light the existence of heterogeneity among commodity-rich economies. The model introduces
government consumption in a non-separable form to the utility function. Commodities have a
central role in private consumption, production of final goods, and windfalls for the domestic
government. We feed the model with a variety of shocks that were previously proposed by the
previous literature. The estimations of the model show that oil-rich economies are more vul-
nerable to external shocks than their commodity-rich counterparts. This is mainly the result
of the size of commodity windfalls in the economy, as the share of oil revenues are significantly
higher than the revenues of other commodities, as a ratio of output. The results also show
that there exists a policy crowding out effect of fiscal policy to monetary policy in oil-rich
economies, all explaining the choice of an exchange rate peg regime in most oil-rich economies.
Keywords: New Keynesian models, Business Cycle, Open Economy Macroeconomics, Joint
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1 Introduction
There exists a long and growing literature that investigates the effect of commodities on commodity-
rich economies. The seminal paper by Sachs and Warner 1995 illustrated the adverse effect of
the abundance of natural resources on economic growth. In addition, Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009
illustrate that the high volatility of commodity prices seems to be the quintessence of the resource
curse since it generates large real exchange rate fluctuations and less investment, especially in
countries where financial development is lagging (Aghion et al. 2009). Nevertheless, the above
findings were challenged by numerous papers that have questioned the natural resource curse,
pointing to examples of commodity-exporting countries that have done well, such as Chile, Norway
and Botswana1. Moreover, Alexeev and Conrad 2009, Cotet and Tsui 2010 and Havranek et al.
2016 find very little evidence in support of the natural resource curse, while Ploeg 2011 showed
empirical evidence that either outcome is possible, leading the literature to deviate from consensus
on this issue. Another seminal paper by Mehlum et al. 2006 showed that institutions are a vital
factor for the effect of resources on economic performance2.
One possible explanation for the above disparity is that the literature mentioned above usually
assumes that this group of countries is homogeneous. For instance, many studies that have been
conducted on a single commodity-rich economy assumed that their results apply on all commodity-
rich economies, labelling their case study as "prototypical" or "quintessential"3. In this paper, we
try to contribute to the growing literature on natural resources and economic performance by
highlighting one possible source of heterogeneity among commodity-rich economies. We try to
capture this heterogeneity by imposing the same commodity-price shock on a number of resource-
rich economies. Doing so will allow us to show how the social capabilities of each economy and
the characteristics of the commodity affect the response of key macroeconomic variables to a
commodity-price shock. Two findings in the literature motivate our approach. The first is Rodrik
1999’s findings that the magnitude of a country’s growth deceleration since the 1970’s is a function
1 Larsen 2006 exhibited Norway as an example of an oil-rich country that was able to escape the Resource Curse.
Englebert 2000, Sarraf and Jiwanji 2001, Acemoglu et al. 2003 and Iimi 2006 are among those noting Botswana’s
conspicuous escape from the Resource Curse.
2 These findings refute the findings of Sachs and Warner 1995 of an insignificant role for institutions in overcoming
the resource curse, and they show that the quality of institutions has to increase as the size of resources increase in
the economy.
3See, for example, Isham et al. 2005, Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009, and Dauvin and Guerreiro 2017.
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of both the magnitude of the shocks and a country’s social capability for adapting to shocks. Also,
Fernández et al. 2018 findings that there is strong comovement among the prices of commodities.
Thus, this will enable us to isolate the two factors affecting the response of macroeconomic variables
in each economy, and solely concentrate on the social capabilities and the characteristics of the
commodity. To the extent of our knowledge, the existing literature has not yet addressed this
phenomenon.
This paper proposes a small open economy model for a commodity-rich country to quanti-
tatively study the triggers of business cycles in different commodity-rich economies. This paper
extends the model used in Troug 2019 by adding some features to the model to make it more
relevant for a commodity-rich economy. The model contains four key features. First, the supply
of commodities is exogenous, and it is affected by political, geographical, and technical factors,
i.e., non-economic factors. Second, the government is the sole owner of commodities and it col-
lects the windfalls of selling them to the rest of the world4. Third, the small open economy is a
price taker for all goods and services it produces and consumes. Also, the small open economy is
affected by the second second-round effect of an increase in the commodity prices in the form of
high foreign inflation and low world demand. Fourth, households and firms, both in the domestic
economy and the rest of the world economy, use commodities for consumption and as a factor
of production, respectively. In addition, the main behavioural parameters that the paper focuses
on are the elasticity of substitution between government consumption and private consumption
and the response of government consumption to fluctuations in the commodity prices. The former
parameter is an indicator of the efficiency of government consumption and its effect on private
consumption (crowding-in versus crowding-out), while the latter captures the behaviour and the
stance of fiscal policy during booms and busts of commodity prices, along with the size of the
commodity windfalls in the government’s revenue.
The analysis of this paper proceeds in four steps. First, we empirically estimate our behavioural
parameters. Second, we generate the impulse response of the data using a structural VAR model.
Third, we illustrate the full structure of our DSGE model. The model generates extra sources of
stochastic processes that were proposed by the existing literature. The calibration of the parameters
4 Introducing the fiscal sector was neglected by Fernández et al. 2018, leaving out the most significant transmission
channel for commodities-price shocks in commodity-rich economies, as highlighted by Cespedes and Velasco 2014
and Pieschacon 2012.
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for our DSGE model is made for all of our economies of interest based on the empirical findings
of this paper and the long-term averages found in the data. Fourth, we use Bayesian estimation
techniques to calculate the variance decomposition of our variables of interest. The empirical and
theoretical findings of this paper show that consumption is excessively volatile relative to output,
which is consistent with the findings of the previous literature5. However, our findings show that
this might also be the case for developed countries which are rich with natural resources, as in
the case of Australia. The results also show that, once we control for the commodity prices, there
is heterogeneity in the forces driving the business cycle within commodity-rich economies. The
fiscal sectors in these economies drive these forces, along with institutional factors and the share
of commodity windfalls in the government’s total revenue.
Our results show the existence of a procyclical fiscal stance in developing, commodity-rich
countries. This is consistent with the findings of Kaminsky et al. 2005, Frankel 2011, and Bastourre
et al. 2012. Nevertheless, we find that adopting the fiscal rule, as in the case of Chile and Australia,
reverses this behaviour, consistent with the findings of Cespedes and Velasco 2014. Our findings
also support the findings of Rodrik 1999 and Isham et al. 2005 of how the abundance of commodities
erodes institutions, and that, in return, will affect how economies react to commodity shocks. The
results of this paper, at least regarding commodity-rich economies, strongly support the findings
of Gali et al. 2007 and Bouakez and Rebei 2007 who show that government consumption has a
crowding in effect on private consumption.
The paper also shows significant heterogeneity in the contribution of terms of trade to business
cycles among commodity-rich economies and illustrate that oil-rich economies are more vulnerable
to these shocks. These results complement the work of Fernández et al. 2018, Shousha 2016,
Fernández Martin et al. 2017, and Drechsel and Tenreyro 2017, who show a significant role for the
proxy of terms of trade (commodity prices) in driving business cycles in developing economies6. The
results of the paper show that the effect of external shocks on commodity-rich economies is sensitive
to the degree of openness in these economies and the adopted fiscal regime in each economy. This
is attributed to the fact that the government is the main channel for the transmission of these
5 See, for example, Neumeyer and Perri 2005, Aguiar and Gopinath 2007, Garcia-Cicco et al. 2010, Akinci 2014,
and Drechsel and Tenreyro 2017.
6 The findings of Broda 2004 support these results, but they were challenged by Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2017
who undermine the role of commodities in driving business cycles.
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fluctuations in commodity-rich economies as illustrated by Arezki and Ismail 2013. Our results
also show that oil-rich countries, in this case as well, are more affected by external shocks than
their commodity-rich counterparts.
The organisation of the remainder of this paper is as follows. In the second chapter, we illustrate
our stylized facts and empirical findings for our economies of interest. In the third chapter, we
build a DSGE model for a commodity-rich small open economy. We add some structural shocks
that were suggested by the previous literature and calibrate the model based on our empirical
findings and the long-term parameters found in the data. In the fourth chapter, we estimate the
model using Bayesian estimation techniques. Chapter five concludes.
2 Stylized Facts
2.1 Data
Figure 1: Real GDP Growth and Commodities Prices
(a) Real GDP per Capita Growth (b) Commodities Prices
This paper uses real government consumption, real private consumption, and inflation for a selected
number of commodity-rich economies7 8. In addition to this, we add the same variables for the
U.S economy, as it will be used to calibrate the moments of the rest of the world, as shown below.
7The selected countries are Chile, a Copper-rich economy; Australia, a minerals-rich economy; Saudi Arabia, an
oil-rich economy; and South Africa a coal and minerals-rich economy.
8Due to the unavailability of the required data for the Chilean CPI inflation at the WDI database, we use the
series available at inflation.eu.
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The source of this data is World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) database, and all
of the series are presented in annual per capita terms.
The commodity prices indices were retrieved from the World Bank commodity prices database
(the pink sheet). All commodity prices were deflated using the U.S. CPI index. The deflation is
done to reflect the real purchasing power of commodity windfalls. We also use mean deviation of
real commodity prices rather than de-trending the series in order to capture long persistence in
commodity prices (super cycles). The data for the supply of commodities was downloaded from
the IEA database.
The above graph shows significant heterogeneity in the growth rate of GDP per capita among
the selected commodity-rich economies. We also include the US growth rate for reference. The
above figure illustrates how the growth rates of commodity-rich economies deviate from the growth
rate of GDP per capita in the US by different magnitudes. One possible explanation for this
behaviour is the volatility of the prices of commodities in these economies9, as shown in panel (b)
of the above figure.
The above graph also shows comovement in the prices of commodities, consistent with the
findings of Fernández et al. 2018. As noted, the fluctuation of commodities prices results in high
volatility in commodity-rich economies. In this paper, we impose the same commodity price on all
of our selected economies to capture the heterogeneity among these economies beyond the different
price fluctuations of each commodity. The price index that we impose in this paper is an average
of both the energy and non-energy indices. The energy price index is a weighted average of crude
oil prices, natural gas prices, and coal prices. Agricultural products and metal, on the other hand,
represent almost 97 % of the non-energy price index.
2.2 What Affects Commodity Prices?
The framework of the theoretical model assumes that commodity prices are determined by com-
modity supply10, World output, World technology, andWorld government consumption. Therefore,
the analysis of this section will not affect the structure nor the design of this model, as the pa-
rameters that govern the effect of our independent variables on real commodity prices are derived
9See, for example, Rodrik 1999.
10 We use energy supply as a proxy for commodity supply due to the unavailability of total commodities supply.
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endogenously in the model and not estimated. Nevertheless, this exercise is useful as it will give
us an indication of how real commodity prices are affected by developments in the macro variables
of the world economy. The regression of this section is specified in the following from:
P˜ ∗O,t = β0 + β1Y ∗t + β2G∗t + β3O∗st + t (1)
Where P˜ ∗O,t =
PO,t−P¯O
P¯O
∗ 100 is the mean deviation of real commodity prices. Y ∗t , G∗t , O∗st
are world output, world government consumption and the supply of commodities, respectively.
The results of the regression are shown in the below table and they highlight a significant effect
of the supply of commodities and world output on real commodity prices. World government
consumption, however, does not significantly affect commodity prices. The signs of the effect of
the supply of commodities and world output are in line with the derivations of the DSGE model
of this paper, as shown below.
Table 1: Regression Results for Commodity Prices
Commodity Prices
World Output 1.46**
(0.566)
World Government Consumption -1.046
(1.434)
Commodities Supply -7.787***
(2.753)
Constant -614.7
(800.355)
Observations 36
R-squared 0.38
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1
2.3 The Effect of Government Consumption on Private Consumption
In this section, we empirically estimate the effect of government consumption on private con-
sumption in the four commodity-rich economies and the U.S. economy, which represents the world
economy in this model. For the U.S. economy, we estimate the effect of government consumption
on private consumption, controlling for the commodity price index, U.S. output, and U.S. inflation.
As for the other four economies, we control for world output, the commodity price index, domestic
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inflation, and domestic output. The regression of this section is specified in the following from:
ln(Ct) = β0 + χln(Gt) + β1ln(Xt) + t (2)
Where Ct is private consumption, Gt is government consumption, and Xt is a vector of control
variables including world output, domestic output, domestic inflation and the real price of com-
modities. All variables are expressed in log forms. The key parameter of interest in this regression
is χ, which denotes the effect of government consumption on private consumption. The results of
the regressions show a significant positive effect of government consumption on private consump-
tion for all five economies. As these results represent one of our behavioural parameters, we will
use the below results in the baseline calibration part of our DSGE model, and they will be included
as priors in the Bayesian estimation.
Table 2: Regression Results for the Effect of G on C
Domestic Consumption USA KSA CHL SA AUS
World Output 1.151*** -0.701*** -0.378** -0.037 0.781***
(0.016) (0.162) (0.175) (0.027) (0.177)
World Government Consumption 0.056
(0.038)
World Inflation -0.524***
(0.143)
Domestic Output -0.073 1.119*** 1.127*** -0.624***
(0.202) (0.114) (0.106) (0.176)
Domestic Government Consumption 0.736*** 0.221* 0.145** 0.712***
(0.170) (0.121) (0.062) (0.135)
Domestic Inflation 0.642 -0.01 -0.074 -0.34
(1.63) (0.205) (0.276) (0.369)
Commodity Prices 0.035*** 0.177 -0.053 -0.022 0.038*
(0.005) (12.45) (0.04) (0.027) (0.02)
Constant -250.58*** 1116.506*** -138.52 -283.99*** 172.256**
(23.47) (358.63) (125.65) (93.027) (68.047)
Observations 36 36 36 36 36
R-squared 0.99 0.82 0.99 0.97 0.92
Bootstrap standard errors with 10,000 replications are in parentheses.
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
The below results also contribute to the divided literature on the effect of government con-
sumption on private consumption11. Our results support the literature that shows government
consumption as a complement to private consumption, at least in commodity-rich countries. Nev-
ertheless, some of causality tests for all the regressions in this section show conflicting signs of
11Coenen et al. 2013, Gali et al. 2007, and Fiorito and Kollintzas 2004 find that government consumption has
a crowding in effect on private consumption. Aschauer 1985 and Ahmed 1986, on the other hand, show that
government consumption has a crowding out effect on private consumption.
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the directions imposed by the regression assumptions. Also, we acknowledge the possibility of the
presence of endogeneity in the estimations. However, using a DSGE model in the next section will
allow us to overcome these problems, because it takes into account the fact that these variables are
simultaneously determined. Moreover, We will also further investigate this issue in the Bayesian
estimation section and, as shown below, the Bayesian estimations show that the explanatory power
of the data overcomes the prior values that we extract from the regression results in this section.
2.4 Business Cycle Moments
Table 3: Business Cycle Moments for Selected Economies
World GDP growth Gov. Growth Cons. Growth Inflation
Mean 1.68 0.57 2.01 2.03
Std. Deviation 1.86 1.68 1.74 0.86
Persistence 0.32 0.59 0.50 0.33
Correlation with GDP growth 1.00 -0.04 0.94 -0.04
Correlation with Gov. Growth -0.04 1.00 0.06 -0.23
Correlation with Cons. Growth 0.94 0.06 1.00 -0.14
Correlation with inflation -0.04 -0.23 -0.14 1.00
KSA GDP growth Gov. Growth Cons. Growth Inflation
Mean -1.51 2.40 1.47 1.35
Std. Deviation 8.75 10.02 9.21 2.33
Persistence 0.31 0.12 0.36 0.72
Correlation with GDP growth 1.00 -0.05 -0.14 0.28
Correlation with Cons. Growth -0.05 1.00 0.40 0.30
Correlation with Gov. Growth -0.14 0.40 1.00 0.45
Correlation with inflation 0.28 0.30 0.45 1.00
CHL GDP growth Gov. Growth Cons. Growth Inflation
Mean 2.99 1.70 3.37 9.98
Std. Deviation 4.32 2.86 6.01 8.59
Persistence 0.25 0.44 -0.41 0.79
Correlation with GDP growth 1.00 0.35 0.92 -0.02
Correlation with Gov. Growth 0.35 1.00 0.25 -0.65
Correlation with Cons. Growth 0.92 0.25 1.00 -0.01
Correlation with inflation -0.02 -0.65 -0.01 1.00
SA GDP growth Gov. Growth Cons. Growth Inflation
Mean 0.41 0.96 0.62 3.55
Std. Deviation 2.45 2.56 3.99 1.94
Persistence 0.43 0.35 0.03 0.77
Correlation with GDP growth 1.00 0.32 0.86 0.10
Correlation with Gov. Growth 0.32 1.00 0.26 0.14
Correlation with Cons. Growth 0.86 0.26 1.00 -0.03
Correlation with inflation 0.10 0.14 -0.03 1.00
AUS GDP growth Gov. Growth Cons. Growth Inflation
Mean 1.75 0.38 0.38 2.42
Std. Deviation 1.66 1.22 1.85 1.04
Persistence 0.21 0.58 0.02 0.42
Correlation with GDP growth 1.00 -0.03 -0.40 -0.37
Correlation with Gov. Growth -0.03 1.00 0.19 -0.43
Correlation with Cons. Growth -0.40 0.19 1.00 0.15
Correlation with inflation -0.37 -0.43 0.15 1.00
The above table shows that private consumption in developing countries fluctuates more than
output which, as mentioned above, consistent with the existing literature on developing economies.
Nevertheless, the business cycle moments for Australia, which is a developed economy, show that
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consumption fluctuates more than output, highlighting the possibility of commodities affecting the
business cycle of developed economies the same way they affect developing economies. The above
persistence measures were estimated by fitting an AR(1) model for each variable.
The above table also shows that the behaviour of the growth rates of per capita government
consumption demonstrates significant differences among the above economies. This variable shows
more volatility in Saudi Arabia (an oil-rich economy). The growth rates of the same variable for
South Africa and Chile, although three times less volatile than that of the Saudi economy, are still
higher than the volatility of government consumption in the U.S. economy. Conversely, the growth
of government consumption in Australia, which is a developed economy, showed less volatility than
all of the above countries, including the U.S. Furthermore, the volatility in government consumption
is positively correlated with the volatility of output per capita and the persistence of the growth
of government consumption is negatively correlated with its volatility across all economies. These
indicators demonstrate the different degrees of volatility among commodity-rich economies which
might result from different factors that we aim to study in this paper we remove the effect of
commodity prices.
2.5 The Reaction of Government Consumption to Changes in Commod-
ity Prices
In this section, we estimate the second and probably most important behavioural parameter in
the model. We empirically estimate the reaction of government consumption in our selected four
economies to changes in the average commodity index. The magnitude of the response of govern-
ment consumption to changes in commodity prices will be an indicator of two important factors.
The first is the fiscal disciplines of the domestic government while the second is the size of the
resource rent in the economy. We control for domestic output and domestic CPI inflation. The
regression of this section is specified in the following from:
ln(Gt) = β0 + φgp˜∗O,t + β1ln(Xt) + t (3)
Where Gt is is government consumption, p˜∗O,t is the mean deviation of the real prices of commodi-
ties, and Xt is a vector of control variables including domestic output and domestic inflation. All
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variables are expressed in log forms. As noted above, the key parameter of interest in this regres-
sion is φg, which denotes the response of government consumption to changes in real commodity
prices.
Table 4: Regression Results for the reaction of G to changes in Commodity prices
Government Consumption KSA CHL SA AUS
Commodity Prices 0.78*** 0.25*** -0.04 -0.01
(0.14) (0.048) (0.08) (0.017)
Domestic Output -0.713 0.44*** 0.87*** 0.29***
(2.27) (0.10) (0.26) (0.025)
Domestic Inflation -0.212 0.11 2.24 -0.9*
(0.375) (0.314) (0.59) (0.48)
Constant 1161.3*** 637.95*** -33.16 475.7***
(418.13) (162.69) (278.30) (26.9)
Observations 36 36 36 36
R-squared 0.63 0.94 0.77 0.83
Bootstrap standard errors with 10,000 replications are in parentheses.
*** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.1.
The above results show that the reactions of the domestic governments display considerable dif-
ferences among commodity-rich economies. While government consumption does not significantly
react to changes in the prices of commodities in Australia and South Africa, it was significantly
positive in Chile and Saudi Arabia with responses of differing degrees. The response of government
consumption in Saudi Arabia is three times the response of government consumption in Chile. One
possible explanation for this behaviour is the size of the resource rents in the economy. During our
estimation period, resource rents as a percentage of GDP in Saudi Arabia, Chile, South Africa, and
Australia averaged 34 %, 10.9 %, 6.25 % and 4.8 %, respectively (as shown in Appendix C.3)12.
The above estimations of this behavioural parameter will also be used below in the baseline
calibration of our model. These values will also be used as priors in the Bayesian estimation to be
undertaken later.
2.6 Structural VAR Model
In this section, we address the effect of a commodity shock on the domestic economy by providing
an empirical measure based on a Structural VAR model. Commodity shocks are easier to cap-
ture as they are observed, different from unobserved technology shocks. Thus, understanding the
12In Appendix C.3 we report the resource rents averages for 88 countries. The stark finding in the data is the
relatively higher share of natural resources, as a percentage of GDP, when the commodity is crude oil compared to
other commodities.
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channels by which the effect of commodity prices affects economic activity is crucial from a policy
perspective.
The Structural VAR model for each domestic economy includes four variables, namely the real
commodity price index, the growth rate of real government consumption per capita, the growth
rate of real private consumption per capita, and domestic CPI inflation, using annual data over
the period 1980 to 2015 and defined as follows:
A0Yt = αt +A1Yt−1 + .....+ApYt−p + ut (4)
Yt is a vector containing the four variables of interest for each economy. The underlying
assumption that we make for this Structural VAR model is that real commodity prices are not
contemporaneously affected by developments in the domestic economies. This is consistent with
the small open economy framework that we adopt in this paper. Thus, having commodity prices
first in the order of our variables in a Cholesky decomposition is a plausible assumption. The
second variable in order is the growth rate of government consumption. This ordering is in line
with Pieschacon 2012, Gali et al. 2007 and Fatas and Mihov 2001. It is also consistent with the
analysis of this paper in showing how commodity shocks are transmitted to the economy through
the fiscal sector. The results below are robust to different ordering between private consumption
and inflation. In addition, the optimal lag criteria suggests that a lag of order 1 is the optimal
choice for each of the four economies.
The economic principle behind the effect of a commodity price shock in our model is simple.
When positive, a commodity-price shock acts as an income shock that increases government con-
sumption. In return, The increase in government consumption will boost private consumption and
put inflationary pressure on domestic prices, if government consumption has a crowding in effect
on private consumption.
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Figure 2: Response to a Commodity Shock
The impulse responses illustrate how government consumption growth responds in a different
manner among commodity-rich economies. The response of government consumption in Saudi
Arabia, an oil-rich country, is the highest among its counterparts in this study. In addition, the
insignificant response of Australia and Chile reflect the adopted fiscal policy objective or rule in
these two economies. The reaction of the South African government consumption shows a positive
reaction to a commodity-price shock. This contradicts with the findings of the previous estimations
of this paper. Nevertheless, the Bayesian estimation section should confirm one of these findings.
The reaction of private consumption and domestic CPI inflation is determined by the crowding
in effect of government consumption and the implemented subsidies schemes that are adopted in
different commodity-rich economies. In this regard, the size of the consumption of commodities
in the aggregate consumption bundle should reflect the size of these subsidies in our DSGE model
below.
The next section builds a dynamic general equilibrium model guided by these stylized facts
where we formally articulate a mechanism by which exogenous changes in commodity prices turn
13
into fluctuations in real economic activity, along with other exogenous shocks that have been
suggested by the previous literature.
3 The Model
Domestic Households
Domestic GovernmentCommodity
Domestic Firms Domestic Central Bank
Foreign HouseholdsForeign Firms Foreign Central Bank
Foreign Government
(+) Utility maximisers
(+) Supplies labour
(+) Consume goods and commodi-
ties, and receives dividends
(+) Utility maximisers
(+) Supplies labour
(+) Consume goods and commodi-
ties, and receives dividends
(+) Supply goods and dividends
(+) Demand labour
(+) Use commodities as a factor of
production
(+) Supply goods and dividends
(+) Demand labour
(+) Use commodities as a factor of
production
(+) Increase households’ utility
(+) Collects commodities windfalls
and taxes
(+) Increase households’ utility
(+) collects taxes
(+) Affects the economy through
the intertemporal channel and the
purchasing power of the domestic
currency
(+) Affects the economy through
the intertemporal channel
(+)Prices are determined
endogenously
Figure 3: Structure of the Model
In this section we construct a small open economy model for a commodity-rich economy by using
the framework of Galí and Monacelli 2005. Moreover, we extend the model used in Troug 2019
by adding some features that were missing in the model to make it relevant for a commodity-rich
economy. Our model allows for a quadruple role for commodities. First, the domestic government
collects the windfalls from selling commodities to the rest of the world. Second, commodities are
consumed by households both in the domestic economy and the foreign economy. Third, firms
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both in the domestic economy and the foreign economy use commodities as an input factor in their
production. Lastly, the domestic economy is affected by the second-round effect of an increase in
commodity prices in the form of high foreign inflation and low world demand or vice versa.
3.1 Domestic Economy
3.1.1 Household
The representative consumer in the domestic economy seeks to maximise the following discounted
lifetime utility function:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(C¯t, Nt) (5)
The utility function is assumed to be continuous and twice differentiable. Nt is the number
of hours worked; β is the discount factor; C¯t is the aggregate consumption bundle. The aggre-
gate consumption bundle is a constant elasticity of substitution aggregate that consists of private
consumption Ct and government consumption Gt:
C¯t =
[
δχC1−χt + (1− δ)χG1−χt
] 1
1−χ (6)
Where δ is the equilibrium share of private consumption in the aggregate consumption bundle
and χ is the inverse elasticity of substitution between private consumption and government con-
sumption. From equations (5) and (6) we can notice that the utility function is non-decreasing
in government consumption Gt. The above utility function is subject to the following budget
constraint:
∫ 1
0
PH,t(j)CHt(j)dj +
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
Pi,t(j)Cit(j)djdi+ EtQt,t+1Dt+1 ≤ Dt +WtNt + Tt (7)
Where Dt is the nominal payoff for bonds, shares in firms and deposits held at the end of period
t and mature at period t+1. Qt,t+1 is a stochastic discount factor of nominal payoffs and it is
equal to 1Rt ; Wt is wages; Tt is lump-sum transfers to the households net of lump-sum taxes. All
units are expressed in terms of domestic currency. In addition, the private consumption basket is
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a composite of core consumption and consumption of commodities:
Ct =
[
(1−$) 1µC
µ−1
µ
Z,t +$
1
µC
µ−1
µ
O,t
] µ
µ−1 (8)
In the above equation, CO,t is consumption of commodities by the domestic economy’s households,
and $ is the share of commodities consumption in the household’s consumption bundle. CZ,t is
the non-commodity consumption bundle (core consumption), and it has a size of (1 − $) in the
household’s consumption bundle. µ is the elasticity of substitution between core consumption and
consumption of commodities. The core consumption bundle CZ,t is a CES composite of home and
foreign goods defined as follows:
CZ,t =
[
(1− α) 1ηC
η−1
η
H,t + (α)
1
ηC
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1 (9)
The above equation is the same household’s consumption bundle used by Galí and Monacelli
2005, which is the workhorse for small open economies. α here is the degree of openness in the
economy which represents the share of imported goods CF,t in the household’s consumption bundle.
The home bias parameter (1 − α) produces the possibility of a different consumption bundle in
each economy. This is a consequence of having different consumption baskets in each country,
despite the law of one price holding for each individual good. η > 0 is the elasticity of substitution
between domestically produced goods and imported goods in the household’s consumption bundle.
The above utility function assumes two separabilities. The first is the separation between
consumption and the amount of hours worked, and the second is time separability. The household’s
problem is analysed in two stages here. We first deal with the expenditure minimisation problem
faced by the representative household to derive the demand functions for commodity goods, non-
commodity goods, domestic goods and foreign goods. In the second stage, the households choose
the level of Ct and Nt, given the optimally chosen combination of goods. The standard optimality
condition for households will be as follows:
Wt
Pt
= Nϕt C¯σt
(Ct
C¯t
)χ
δ−χ (10)
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The intertemporal optimality condition is:
β
( C¯t+1
C¯t
)χ−σ( Pt
Pt+1
)( Ct
Ct+1
)χ
= Qt,t+1 (11)
Taking the conditional expectation of equation (11) and rearranging the terms we get:
βRtEt
[( C¯t+1
C¯t
)χ−σ( Pt
Pt+1
)( Ct
Ct+1
)χ]
= 1 (12)
3.2 Firms
3.2.1 Price Setting Behaviour
The firms in this model set their prices in a staggered manner following Calvo 198313. Under
Calvo contracts, we have a random fraction 1 − θ of firms that are able to reset their prices at
period t, while prices of the remaining firms of size θ are fixed at the previous period’s price levels.
Therefore, we can say that θk is the probability that a price set at period t will still be valid at
period t + k. Also, the probability of the firm re-optimising its prices will be independent of the
time passed since it last re-optimised its prices, and the average duration for prices not to change
is 11−θ . Given the above information, the aggregate domestic price level will have the following
form:
PH,t =
[
θ(PH,t−1)1− + (1− θ)(P¯ 1−H,t )
] 1
1− (13)
Where P¯H,t is the new price set by the optimising firms. From the derivations shown in
Appendix C.2, we get the following form for inflation:
Π1−H,t = θ + (1− θ)
( P¯H,t
Pt−1
)1−
(14)
The above equation shows that the domestic inflation rate at any given period will be solely
determined by the fraction of firms that reset their prices at that period. When a given firm in the
economy sets its prices, it seeks to maximise the expected discounted value of its stream of profits,
13The Calvo model makes aggregation easier because it gets rid of the heterogeneity in the economy. The
alternative pricing scheme is the quadratic cost of price adjustment by Rotemberg 1982. The two dynamics are
equivalent up to a first-order approximation.
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conditional that the price it sets remains effective:
maxP¯H,t
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{
Qt,t+k[cjt+k|t(P¯H,t −Ψt+k)]
}
(15)
The above equation is subject to a sequence of demand constraints: cjt+k =
(
P¯H,t
PH,t+k
)−
Ct.
Solving this problem (also shown in Appendix C.2) yields the following optimal decision rule:
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{
Qt,t+kCt+k
[ P¯H,t
PH,t−1
−MMCt+k|tΠHt−1,t+k
]}
= 0 (16)
WhereM is the firm’s markup at the steady state andMCt is real marginal cost. As we can see
from equation (16), in the sticky price scheme producers, given their forward-looking behaviour,
adjust their prices at a random period to maximise the expected discounted value of their profits
at that period and in the future. Thus, firms in this model will set their prices equal to a markup
plus the present value of the future expected stream of their marginal costs. This is done because
firms know that the price they set at period t will remain effective for a random period of time in
the future. We also assume that all firms in the economy face the same marginal cost, given the
constant return to scale assumption imposed on the model and the subsidy that the government
pays to firms, as we will see in the following section. The firms also use the same discount factor
β as the one used by households, and this is attributed to the fact that the households are the
shareholders of these firms. Additionally, all the firms that optimise their prices in any given period
will choose the same price which is also a consequence of the firms facing the same marginal cost.
Equation (16) also shows that the inflation rate is proportional to the discounted sum of the future
real marginal costs additional to a mark-up resulting from the monopolistic power of the firms.
3.2.2 Production
Firm (j) in the domestic economy produces a differentiated good following a linear production
function:
Yt(j) = [AtNt(j)]νOdt (j)1−ν (17)
In the above equation, Yt(j) is the output of final good (j) in the home economy. At is the level
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of technology in the production function. It evolves exogenously and is assumed to be common
across all firms in the economy. Nt(j) is the labour force employed by firm (j). Odt is the commodity
used in the production process and (1− ν) is the size of commodities in the production function.
The log form of total factor productivity at = log(At) is assumed to follow an AR(1) process:
at = ρaat−1 + a,t. Where ρa is the autocorrelation of the shock and the innovation to technology
a,t is assumed to have a zero mean and a finite variance σa. The cost minimisation function for
firm (j) has the following form:
(1− τ)(1− ν)WtNt(j) = νPo,tOdt (j) (18)
We note that in the above equation we left Wt without any firm specification, as we have a
competitive labour market in this model. Also, τ is the subsidy that the government gives to
firms in order to eliminate the markup distortion created by the firms’ monopolistic power. The
marginal cost equation takes the following form:
MCt(j) =
(1− τ)Wt
νAνtO
d
t (j)1−νNt(j)ν−1
(19)
Using the above cost minimising equation, the above marginal cost equation is utilised to:
MCt(j) =
(1− τ)νW νt P 1−νo,t
νν(1− ν)(1−ν)Aνt
(20)
Lastly, given that aggregate output and aggregate employment in the domestic economy are
defined by the Dixit and Stiglitz 1977 aggregator, the aggregate production function will take the
following form:
Yt = [AtNt]νOd(1−ν)t (21)
3.3 Fiscal Policy
The government levies a lump sum tax on households and pays a subsidy to firms in order to
eliminate its monopolistic power. The government also collects windfalls from sales of its natural
resources, and has access to the financial markets. Therefore, the government budget constraint is
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defined as14:
Gt + (1 +Rt−1)Bt−1 + τ = Bt + Tt + φgPt,oYt,o (22)
Where Bt is the quantity of a riskless one-period bond maturing in the current period, which
pays one unit. Rt denotes the gross nominal return on bonds purchased in period t. The govern-
ment levies a non-distortionary lump-sum tax Tt to finance its consumption and pay a subsidy τ
to firms. In addition, pot is the price of commodities dominated in domestic currency and Y ot is
the output of that commodity15. Given the above, Gt is government consumption will take the
following form:
Gt
G
=
{Gt−1
G
}ρg{Po,tYo
PoYo
}φg
exp(ζG,t) (23)
Where 0 < ρg < 1 is the autocorrelation of government consumption, and it captures the
persistence of government consumption. φg captures the response of government consumption to
changes in the prices of commodities. ζG,t represents an i.i.d. government spending shock with
constant variance σ2g .
3.3.1 Monetary Policy
The monetary authorities in this model use a short-term interest rate as their policy tool. In
this case, we have a cashless economy where money supply is implicitly determined to achieve the
interest rate target. It is also assumed that the central bank will meet all the money demanded
under the policy rate it sets.
Rt
R
=
{ΠZ,t
ΠZ
}φpi{Yt
Y
}φx
exp(ζR,t) (24)
The parameters of the above equations (φpi, φx) describe the strength of the response of the
policy rate to deviations in the variables on the right-hand side. These parameters are assumed
14The definition of government consumption includes all government recurrent spending items. We do this to
establish consistency in the mapping between the model’s government consumption variable and the observed
government consumption variable.
15Given the fact that the production of natural resources is capital intensive, we follow the existing literature
(e.g., Wills 2014, Berg et al. 2013 and Agénor 2014) by assuming that production of natural resources is exogenous.
moreover, the share of employment in the natural resource sector does not exceed 3 % of total employment in
natural resource-rich economies, according to the ILO database, and the labour force lacks mobility between the
two sectors.
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to be non-negative. The inflation response parameter φpi in the above policy rule must be strictly
greater than one in order for the solution of the model to be unique, as shown by Bullard and
Mitra 2002. Lastly, ζR,t represents an i.i.d. monetary policy shock with constant variance σ2R.
3.4 International Linkages
We first start by the defining the terms of trade as the ratio of imported prices to domestic
prices. The bilateral terms of trade index between the domestic economy and any other small
economy (country i) is defined as: Si,t = Pi,tPH,t . The aggregate terms of trade index is defined
as: St =
( ∫ 1
0 S
1−γ
i,t di
) 1
1−γ . Defining PF,t =
( ∫ 1
0 P
1−γ
i,t di
) 1
1−γ allows as us to define the aggregate
effective terms of trade as:
St =
PF,t
PH,t
(25)
If we plug in the log-linearised representation of the imported prices index from the above
equation (pF,t = st+pH,t) in the log-linearised form of the CPI price index equation, we can derive
the CPI index as a function of the domestic prices index and the terms of trade:
pt = pH,t + αst (26)
The above function shows that the gap between the CPI index and the domestic price index
is filled by the terms of trade, representing imported inflation. This gap is parametrised by the
degree of openness of the domestic economy. Before progressing on further derivations, we first
define the bilateral exchange rate Ei,t as the value of country i’s currency in terms of the domestic
currency. Assuming that the law of one price holds, the price of any good in country (i) will be
equal to:
Pi,t(j) = Ei,tP ii,t(j) (27)
Integrating the above equation yields the price index for country (i). Solving this integral for
the imported prices index in the domestic economy yields:
PF,t = EtP ∗t (28)
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The nominal effective exchange rate is equal to Et ≡
∫ 1
0 Ei,tdi, and the world price index
is defined as P ∗t ≡
∫ 1
0 Pi,tdi. Plugging the value of the imported prices index from the above
equation in the definition of the terms of trade yields:
St =
EtP ∗t
PH,t
(29)
We now define the bilateral real exchange rate as the ratio of the price index in country (i)
to the CPI index in the domestic economy: REERi,t = Ei,tP
i
t
Pt
. Integrating the bilateral real
exchange rate equation yields the real effective exchange rate equation for the domestic economy:
REERt = EtP
∗
t
Pt
. From the definitions of the terms of trade and the real effective exchange rate,
we can define the equation that links the two variables in a log-linearised form as follows:
qt = (1− α)st (30)
Under the assumption of complete international financial markets, the price of a one-period
riskless bond dominated in the domestic economy’s currency from country (i) is equal to: Ei,tQit =
E[Ei,t+1Qt,t+1]. If we add this equation to the domestic bond’s price equation (Qt = E[Qt,t+1]),
we get the uncovered interest parity condition:
Qit
Qt
= Et
(Ei,t+1
Ei,t
)
(31)
The uncovered interest parity condition is crucial for the no-arbitrage condition to hold in the
international bonds market. Under the uncovered interest parity we assume that foreign bonds
are perfect substitutes to domestic bonds once both are expressed in the same currency. The
uncovered interest parity equation also implies that higher foreign interest rates or a depreciation
in the exchange rate will put upward pressure on domestic interest rates.
The last thing that we need do in this section is to derive the international risk condition. Under
the assumptions of complete international markets and the identical preferences assumption, the
foreign consumer’s Euler equation can be presented as:
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β
( C¯∗t+1
C¯∗t
)χ−σ( P ∗t
P ∗t+1
)( C∗t
C∗t+1
)χ( Et
Et+1
)
= Qt,t+1 (32)
We divide the domestic inter-temporal optimality condition (eq. 11) by the foreign economy’s
inter-temporal optimality condition (eq. 32) to get:
1 = Et
( ( C¯t+1
C¯t
)χ−σ(
Pt
Pt+1
)(
Ct
Ct+1
)χ
(
C¯∗t+1
C¯∗t
)χ−σ(
P∗t
P∗t+1
)(
Et
Et+1
)(
C∗t
C∗t+1
)χ
)
(33)
Plugging the definition of the real effective exchange rate in the above equation yields:
Ct = VtC∗t (REERt)
1
χ
( C¯t
C¯∗t
)χ−σ
χ (34)
Where Vt = Ct+1C¯
∗χ−σ
χ
t
C∗t+1C¯
χ−σ
χ
t+1 REER
1
χ
t+1
is a constant and it depends on the initial relative wealth
position. We assume that we have a symmetric initial condition and set Vt = 1; meaning that
the net position of foreign assets is equal to zero. Thus, the international risk sharing condition
simplifies to:
Ct = C∗t (REERt)
1
χ
( C¯t
C¯∗t
)χ−σ
χ (35)
Complete security markets ensure that risk-averse consumers are able to trade away the risks
and the shocks they encounter. Under this setting, consumers are able to purchase contingent
claims for realisations of all idiosyncratic shocks, and this will enable them to diversify all idiosyn-
cratic risk through the capital markets. The above international risk sharing condition also shows
how a depreciation in the real effective exchange rate boosts domestic consumption relative to the
foreign economy’s consumption. The log-linearised form of the above international risk sharing
condition is:
ct = c∗t +
(σ − σδ)
σδ
(g∗t − gt) +
1
σδ
qt. (36)
Where σδ = δσ + (1 − δ)χ is a weighted average of the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion σ and the inverse elasticity of substitution between government consumption and private
consumption χ.
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3.4.1 Market clearing conditions
We start by identifying the market clearing condition for the domestically produced products in
the small open economy. Domestic output of good (j) is absorbed both by domestic demand and
foreign demand:
Yt(j) = CH,t(j) +
∫ 1
0
CiH,t(j)di (37)
In the above equation, CH,t(j) is domestic demand for good (j) and CiH,t is country (i)’s demand
for good (j) in the domestic economy. We plug the domestic demand function for good (j). As for
foreign demand for domestic good (j), we use the assumption of symmetric preferences across all
the countries of the world economy to get:
CiH,t(j) =
(PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−( PH,t
Ei,tP iF,t
)−γ(P iF,t
P it
)−η
(38)
Plugging in the respective demand bundles transforms the market clearing condition for do-
mestic production of good (j) to:
Yt(j) =
(PH,t(j)
PH,t
)−(
(1− α)
(PH,t
P it
)−η
Ct + α
∫ 1
0
( PH,t
Ei,tP iF,t
)−γ(P iF,t
P it
)−η
Cit(j)di
)
(39)
Using the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator of domestic output, we can write the above equation in
aggregate terms:
Yt =
(PH,t
P it
)−η(
(1− α)Ct + α
∫ 1
0
(Ei,tP iF,t
PH,t
)γ−η
Qηi,tC
i
tdi
)
(40)
In the above equation, we took
(
PH,t
P it
)−η
as common factor. We have also used the definition
of the bilateral real exchange rate. If we divide and multiply the term
(Ei,tP iF,t
PH,t
)γ−η
by Pi,t we get:(
Pi,t
PH,t
Ei,tP iF,t
Pi,t
)γ−η
. The two terms that we get are basically the effective terms of trade for country
(i) and the bilateral terms of trade between the domestic economy and country (i), and equation
(40) simplifies to:
Yt =
(PH,t
P it
)−η(
(1− α)Ct + α
∫ 1
0
(
SitSi, t
)γ−η
Qηi,tC
i
tdi
)
(41)
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Taking the first order log-linearisation of the above equation around a symmetric steady state
yields:
yt = (1− α)ct + αc∗t + α[γ + η(1− α)]st (42)
Adding the log-linearised form of the international risk sharing condition to the above equation
yields:
yt = y∗t +
(1− α)(σ − σδ)
σδ
(g∗t − gt) +
ωα
σδ
st (43)
where ω = σδγ + (1−α)(ησδ − 1) and ωα = (1−α) +αω. The above equation links the actual
rate of output to foreign and domestic government consumption, the rest of the world economy’s
output, and the terms of trade.
3.4.2 The Supply Side of the Economy
The log-linearised version of the real marginal cost equation could be written in the following
format:
mct = νwt + (1− ν)po,t − νat − pH,t (44)
Adding and subtracting (1− ν)pt yields:
mct = ν(wt − pt) + (1− ν)p˜o,t + αst − νat (45)
Where p˜o,t is the real price of commodities and it is equal to: po,t − pt. Using the log-linearised
form of the labour supply equation, the international risk sharing condition, and replacing the
domestic real commodity prices with international real commodity prices (p˜o,t = p˜∗o,t + (1− α)st),
the above equation transforms to:
mct =
νσδ
1 + ϕ(1− ν)y
∗
t +
νϕ
1 + ϕ(1− ν)yt+st−
ν(1 + ϕ)
1 + ϕ(1− ν)at+
(1− ν)(1 + ϕ)
1 + ϕ(1− ν) p˜
∗
o,t+
(ν(σ − σδ)
1 + ϕ(1− ν)g
∗
t (46)
Plugging in the value of the terms of trade from the international market clearing condition yields:
mct =
νσδωα − σδ − σδϕ(1− ν)
ωα(1 + ϕ(1− ν)) y
∗
t +
νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν)
ωα(1 + ϕ(1− ν)) yt −
ν(1 + ϕ)
1 + ϕ(1− ν)at
+ (1− ν)(1 + ϕ)1 + ϕ(1− ν) p˜
∗
o,t +
(σ − σδ)(νωα − (1− α)− (1− α)ϕ(1− ν))
ωα(1 + ϕ(1− ν)) g
∗
t +
(1− α)(σ − σδ)
ωα
gt
(47)
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Setting mc = −µ and solving the above equation for output yields the equation of the natural rate of
output:
y¯t = −νσδωα − σδ − σδϕ(1− ν)
νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν) y
∗
t − ((σ − σδ)(νωα − (1− α)− (1− α)ϕ(1− ν))
νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν) g
∗
t
− (1− α)(σ − σδ)(1 + ϕ(1− ν))
νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν) gt +
ν(1 + ϕ)ωα
νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν)at −
(1− ν)(1 + ϕ)ωα
νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν) p˜
∗
o,t
(48)
Subtracting the above two equations from each other yields the marginal cost variable as a function of
the output gap:
mˆct =
νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν)
ωα(1 + ϕ(1− ν)) xt (49)
Adding the above equation to the derived Phillips curve in Appendix C.2 enables us to write domestic
inflation as a function of the output gap:
piH,t = βEt{piH,t+1}+ κνϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν)
ωα(1 + ϕ(1− ν)) xt (50)
3.4.3 The Demand Side of the Economy
We start this section by adding the domestic economy’s market clearing condition (eq. 42) to the log form
of the Euler equation (eq. 11) to get:
yt =Et{yt+1} − (1− α)
σδ
(rt − Et{pit+1})− α[γ + η(1− α)]∆Et{st+1} − α∆Et{y∗t+1}
+ (1− α)(σ − σδ)
σδ
∆Et{gt+1}
= Et{yt+1} − (1− α)
σδ
(rt − Et{piH,t+1})− αω
σδ
∆Et{st+1} − α∆Et{y∗t+1}
+ (1− α)(σ − σδ)
σδ
∆Et{gt+1}
= Et{yt+1} − ωα
σδ
(rt − Et{piH,t+1})− α(ω − 1)∆Et{y∗t+1}+ (1− α)(σ − σδ)
σδ
∆Et{gt+1}
+ α(σ − σδ)
σδ
∆Et{g∗t+1}
(51)
In the above system of equations, we made use of the CPI index equation in the domestic economy
(eq. 26) and replaced the value of the terms of trade in equation (43). It is shown above that the effects of
the domestic variables (government expenditure and real interest rates) on output are parametrised by the
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home-bias parameter (1− α), while the effects of the external variables are parametrised by the degree of
openness in the economy α. This is inherited from the market clearing condition of the domestic economy.
Solving the above IS curve for the output gap yields:
xt = Et{xt+1} − ωα
σδ
(rt − Et{pit+1} − r¯rt) (52)
Where:
r¯rt =
σδ
ωα
∆Et{y¯t+1} − σδα(ω − 1)
ωα
∆Et{y∗t+1}+ (1− α)(σ − σδ)
ωα
∆Et{gt+1}+ α(σ − σδ)
ωα
∆Et{g∗t+1}
= − ν(1 + ϕ)σδ(1− ρa))
νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν)at +
(1− ν)(1 + ϕ)σδ
νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν)∆Et{p˜
∗
o,t+1}
+ νϕ(1− α)(σ − σδ)
νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν)∆Et{gt+1}+
(σ − σδ)(νωα(αϕ− σα) + σδ(1 + ϕ− ϕν))
ωα(νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν)) ∆Et{g
∗
t+1}
+ σδ((1 + α)σδ(1 + ϕ(1− ν))− ανϕωα(ω − 1)− αωσδ(1 + ϕ(1− ν))− νωασδ)
ωα(νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν)) ∆Et{y
∗
t+1}
(53)
One of the contributions that this paper makes is adding real commodity prices to the reaction of the
natural rate of interest function. The weight of commodities in the production function (ν) also affects
the reaction of the natural rate of interest to all the possible shocks.
Lastly, to calculate domestic demand for commodities, we replace employment in the cost minimisation
equation to get:
odt =
1 + ϕ
1 + ϕ(1− ν)yt +
νσδ
1 + ϕ(1− ν)y
∗
t − ν(1 + ϕ)1 + ϕ(1− ν)at +
ν(σ − σδ)
1 + ϕ(1− ν)g
∗
t − ν1 + ϕ(1− ν) p˜
∗
o,t (54)
The equation shows that increases in domestic output and world output have a positive effect on domestic
demand for commodities. The effect of world government consumption, however, depends on whether
world government consumption is a complement or a substitute to world private consumption, as the
former’s effect on the domestic economy varies under the two assumptions16. As for domestic technology,
given that it is also a factor of production, it has a negative effect on domestic demand for commodities.
Lastly, real international commodity prices have a negative effect on the demand of commodities in the
domestic economy.
16see Troug 2019 for more details.
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3.5 Rest of the World economy
3.5.1 Households
The representative household of the foreign economy seeks to maximise a similar utility function to the
one shown above for the domestic economy:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU(C¯∗t , N∗t ) (55)
The utility function is assumed to be continuous and twice differentiable. N∗t is the amount of hours
worked; C¯∗t is the aggregate consumption bundle, and it is a constant elasticity of substitution aggregate
consisting of private consumption C∗t and government consumption G∗t :
C¯∗t = [δ
∗χ∗C∗1−χ
∗
t + (1− δ∗)χG∗1−χ
∗
t ]
1
1−χ∗ (56)
Similar to the domestic economy, δ∗ is the weight of private consumption C∗t in the aggregate consump-
tion bundle. C∗t is our basic private consumption bundle, and it is a CES composite of core consumption
and consumption of commodities, defined as follows:
C∗t =
[
(1−$) 1µC∗
µ−1
µ
Z,t +$
1
µC
∗µ−1
µ
O,t
] µ
µ−1 (57)
Where C∗O,t is consumption of commodities by the foreign economy’s households, and $∗ is the share of
oil consumption in the household’s consumption bundle. C∗Z,t is the non-commodity consumption bundle
(core consumption), and it has a size of (1−$∗) in the household’s consumption bundle.
Using the world aggregate demand equation and plugging the foreign economy’s consumption bundles,
we get the aggregate CPI index for the foreign economy:
P ∗t =
[
(1−$∗)P ∗1−µZ,t +$∗P ∗1−µO,t
] 1
1−µ (58)
Analogues to the domestic economy, the labour supply and the consumption intertemporal Euler
equations take the following forms:
W ∗t
P ∗t
= N∗ϕt C¯
∗σ
t
(
C∗t
C¯t
∗
)χ
δ−χ (59)
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The intertemporal optimality condition is:
β
(
C¯∗t+1
C¯t
∗)χ−σ( P ∗t
P ∗t+1
)(
C∗t
C∗t+1
)χ
= Qt,t+1 (60)
3.5.2 Firms
3.5.3 Production
The representative firm in the foreign economy uses commodities and labour as inputs of production in
the following form:
Y ∗t (i) =
[
AtN
∗
t (i)
]ν
O∗dt (i)1−ν (61)
In the above equation, N∗t is labour input, and O∗t is commodities input. ν is the share of non-commodity
factors in the production function. Cost minimising with respect to the production function yields the
optimal resource allocation:
(1− ν)(1− τ)W ∗t N∗t (i) = νP ∗O,tO∗dt (i) (62)
The optimal behaviour of firms requires the technical rate of substitution to equate the relative prices
of the input factors. τ is an employment subsidy which the government in the foreign economy pays to
firms to offset their monopolistic power distortion. The nominal marginal cost equation is defined as:
MC∗t =
(1− τ)νW ∗νt P ∗1−νO,t
νν(1− ν)(1−ν)A∗νt
(63)
3.5.4 Price Setting
As for the price setting behaviour of the firms, we assume that the foreign economy firms also set their
prices according to Calvo 1983 contracts. Thus, the resulting log-linearised New Keynesian Phillips Curve
for the foreign economy is:
pˆi∗t = βEt[pˆi∗t+1] +
(1− θ)(1− θβ)
θ
mˆc∗t (64)
3.5.5 Fiscal Policy
The government in the foreign economy also levies a lump sum tax on the agents of the economy. It also
pays a subsidy to firms in order to eliminate its monopolistic power and it has access to the financial
markets. Therefore, the government budget constraint is given by:
G∗t + (1 +R∗t−1)B∗t−1 + τ∗ = B∗t + T ∗t (65)
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Where B∗t is the quantity of a riskless one-period bond maturing in the current period , and it pays
one unit. R∗t denotes the gross nominal return on bonds purchased in period t. The government levies a
non-distortionary lump-sum tax T ∗t to finance its consumption and pays a subsidy τ∗ to firms. Given the
above, G∗t is government consumption and takes the following form:
G∗t
G∗
=
{
G∗t−1
G∗
}ρg∗
exp(ζG∗,t) (66)
Where 0 < ρ∗g < 1 is the autocorrelation of government consumption, and it captures the persistence of
foreign government consumption. ζG∗,t represents an i.i.d. government consumption shock with constant
variance σ2g∗ .
3.5.6 Monetary Policy
The monetary authority in the foreign economy also uses a short-term interest rate as its policy tool:
R∗t
R∗
=
{Π∗t
Π∗
}φpi{Y ∗t
Y ∗
}φx
exp(ζR∗,t) (67)
Monetary policy in the foreign economy reacts to deviations of inflation from its natural level and
deviations of output from its natural level. ζR∗,t represents an i.i.d. monetary policy shock with constant
variance σ2r∗
3.5.7 The Supply Side of The World Economy
We start this section by writing the log-linearised version of the real marginal cost equation in the foreign
economy as follows:
mc∗t = νw∗t + (1− ν)p∗o,t − νa∗t − p∗t (68)
Adding and subtracting νp∗t yields:
mc∗t = ν(w∗t − p∗t ) + (1− ν)(p˜∗o,t − p∗t )− νa∗t (69)
Using the Euler equation yields:
mc∗t = ν(σc∗t + ϕn∗t + (σ − σδ)g∗t ) + (1− ν)p˜∗o,t − νa∗t (70)
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Using the production function, and the cost minimising equation yields:
mc∗t =
νσ + νϕ
1 + (1− ν)ϕy
∗
t − ν(1 + ϕ)1 + (1− ν)ϕa
∗
t +
(1− ν)(1 + ϕ)
1 + (1− ν)ϕ ˜po,t
∗ + ν(σ − σδ)1 + (1− ν)ϕg
∗
t (71)
Equating mc∗t to the steady-state markup (−µ∗) and solving for output, yields the natural rate of
output equation in the foreign economy:
y¯t
∗ = −1 + (1− ν)ϕ
νσ + νϕ µ
∗ + ν(1 + ϕ)
νσ + νϕ a
∗
t − (1− ν)(1 + ϕ)
νσ + νϕ p˜
∗
o,t − ν(σ − σδ)
νσ + νϕ g
∗
t (72)
Subtracting the above two equations from each other yields the deviation of the marginal cost as a
function of the output gap:
mˆc∗t =
νσ + νϕ
1 + (1− ν)ϕx
∗
t (73)
Adding this to the NKPC equation gives us inflation as a function of the output gap:
pˆi∗t = βEt[pˆi∗t+1] + λ
νσ + νϕ
1 + (1− ν)ϕx
∗
t (74)
3.5.8 The Demand Side of The World Economy
Moving to the demand side of the foreign economy, we add the log-form of the Euler equation to the
market clearing equation (c∗t = y∗t ) to get:
y∗t = Et{y∗t+1} − 1
σδ
[r∗t − Et{pi∗t+1}] + σ − σδ
σδ
∆Et{g∗t+1} (75)
Solving the above IS curve for the output gap yields:
x∗t = Et{x∗t+1} − 1
σδ
[r∗t − Et{pi∗t+1} − r¯r∗t ] (76)
Where:
r¯r∗t = σδ∆y¯∗t+1 + (σ − σδ)∆g∗t+1
= −σδ(1− ρa)(1 + ϕ)ν
ν(ϕ+ σ) a
∗
t +
ν(σ − σδ)(σ + ϕ− σδ)
ν(ϕ+ σ) ∆g
∗
t+1 − σδ(1− ν)(1 + ϕ)
ν(ϕ+ σ) ∆p˜
∗
o,t+1
(77)
In the above equation, similar to the natural rate of interest in the domestic economy, the natural rate
of interest in the foreign economy also reacts to expected changes in the price of commodities.
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3.5.9 Commodities Market Equilibrium
The supply of commodities is assumed to follow an AR(1) process:
O∗st
O∗s
=
{
O∗st−1
O∗s
}ρ∗o
exp(ζo∗,t) (78)
Where 0 < ρ∗o < 1 is the autocorrelation parameter of the supply of commodities, and it captures the
persistence of commodity supply. ζo∗,t represents an i.i.d. commodity supply shock with constant variance
σ2o∗ .
We solve for the demand of commodities from the cost minimisation equation and by plugging the
value of the equilibrium level of employment to derive the demand of commodities in the world economy
as a function of the world output, world technology, world government consumption, and real commodity
prices:
o∗dt =
νσ + ϕ+ 1
1 + ϕ(1− ν)y
∗
t − ν(1 + ϕ)1 + ϕ(1− ν)a
∗
t +
ν(σ − σδ)
1 + ϕ(1− ν)g
∗
t − ν1 + ϕ(1− ν) p˜
∗
o,t (79)
Using the commodities market equilibrium condition (o∗st = o∗dt ), the above equation can be solved for
the equilibrium real commodity price:
p˜∗o,t =
νσ + ϕ+ 1
ν
y∗t − (1 + ϕ)a∗t + (σ − σδ)g∗t − 1 + ϕ(1− ν)
ν
o∗st (80)
The above equation illustrates how the real prices of commodities are driven by demand and supply
factors in the world economy. Government consumption and world output are demand factors that have a
positive effect on real commodity prices. Conversely, the supply of commodities and the world technology
are supply factors that negatively affect the real prices of commodities.
3.6 Calibrated Parameters and Moments of the Model
3.6.1 Baseline Calibration
In this section, we illustrate the baseline calibration of the above model (table shown in Appendix 4). The
parameters set is divided into two sections. The first section illustrates the parameters that this model
adopts from the standard literature17, and the second section highlights the parameters that are specific
to this model.
In the first section of the parameters set, we set θ equal to 0.75, implying that firms only change their
17See Taylor 1993, Galí and Monacelli 2005, Smets and Wouters 2007 and Shousha 2016
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prices once a year. The discount factor β is equal to 0.99. This implies that, given that β = 1/r at the
steady state, annual return is approximately equal to 4 percent. We set ϕ equal to 3, under the assumption
that the labour supply elasticity is 13 . We set φpi & φx equal to 1.5 and 0.5 following Taylor 1993. The
size of household’s private consumption in the aggregate consumption bundle δ equal to 0.95. The share of
non-commodity inputs in the production functions are set to 0.95. The inverse elasticity of intertemporal
substitution of consumption σ is set equal to 1, which implies log utility in consumption. The elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign produced goods η is set to 1. This elasticity describes the
change in consumption of imported goods in response to changes in the prices of foreign goods relative to
domestic prices. The value of the parameter implies that demand of imported goods increases by exactly
1 % when the relative price of foreign goods declines by 1 %. The elasticity of substitution between the
domestically produced goods  equals 6 which corresponds to a steady state markup of 1.2. As for the
standard deviations and persistence of the interest rates and productivity shock processes, we use the ones
used by Smets and Wouters 2007 and Galí and Monacelli 2005, respectively.
As for the second section, the shares of foreign goods in the private consumption baskets of the domestic
economies α are set equivalent to the average share of import to GDP over the sample period (1980-2015).
The standard deviation and the persistence of the commodity supply variable are calculated by fitting
an AR (1) model for the supply of energy which was extracted from the International Energy Agency’s
database. As for the rest of the standard deviations and persistence of the other shock processes, they were
calculated in Table (3). The responses of government consumption to changes in commodity prices φg are
adopted from the estimates shown in Table (4). This implies that a few of the results, which are based on
the baseline calibration, will be inconsistent with the results obtained in the structural VAR estimations.
Nevertheless, the Bayesian estimations will be decisive in this matter.
The inverse elasticities of substitution between government consumption and private consumption for
each of the five economies were all calibrated to values that generate responses of private consumption to
changes in government consumption that are equivalent to the ones estimated in Table (2). As for the share
of commodities consumption in the private consumption bundle, we use the share of energy consumption
in the CPI basket from the OECD.stat database. In this regard, this share was not available for Saudi
Arabia. Therefore, we use the lowest share of commodities in the KSA CPI given the generous subsidies
scheme that was implemented in the country during our sample period, as highlighted by Abusaaq 2015.
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3.6.2 Moments of the Model
Figure 4: Response to a Commodity Shock
In the above graph, we show how the domestic economies react to a commodity shock under the model
structure. In this regard, we add a commodity i.i.d shock to our framework specifically for this part of the
analysis18. The graph illustrates how the four economies react in a different manner to a commodity shock,
similar to all of the results above. It also shows how government consumption in Saudi Arabia, an oil-rich
economy, reacts to the shock more than its counterparts and how inflation in Saudi Arabia moderately
reacts to the commodity shocks given the low share of commodities in the Saudi private consumption
basket19.
Nevertheless, the model seems to overstate the reaction of the Chilean government consumption to the
commodity shock. In addition, government consumption in South Africa behaves countercyclically which
also contradicts with the Structural VAR estimations. These differences reflect the difference between the
previous estimations, as noted above. However, we will re-estimate each of the behaviour parameters below
18The shock process for the average commodity index was constructed by fitting the series to an AR(1) model to
capture the persistence of the index (0.9).
19We show the theoretical effect of all the seven shock of the model on our variables of interest for all of the four
economies in Appendix 4.
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using Bayesian estimation techniques. In addition, the below table shows that the theoretical moments,
under the seven imposed shocks of the model, qualitatively resemble the moments found in the data.
Table 5: Theoretical Moments of the Model
KSA Gov. Consumption Private Consumption Inflation
Std. Deviation 1.01 1.27 0.77
Persistence 0.12 0.34 0.26
Correlation with Gov. Consumption 1.00 0.64 0.01
Correlation with Private consumption 0.64 1.00 0.08
Correlation with inflation 0.01 0.08 1.00
CHL Gov. Consumption Private Consumption Inflation
Std. Deviation 1.11 0.75 0.41
Persistence 0.44 0.16 -0.18
Correlation with Gov. Consumption 1.00 0.32 0.01
Correlation with Private consumption 0.32 1.00 -0.04
Correlation with inflation 0.01 -0.04 1.00
SA Gov. Consumption Private Consumption Inflation
Std. Deviation 1.08 0.78 0.46
Persistence 0.36 0.61 -0.09
Correlation with Gov. Consumption 1.00 0.19 -0.00
Correlation with Private consumption 0.19 1.00 0.00
Correlation with inflation 0.00 0.00 1.00
AUS Gov. Consumption Private Consumption Inflation
Std. Deviation 1.11 1.10 0.51
Persistence 0.44 0.46 0.23
Correlation with Gov. Consumption 1.00 0.71 0.10
Correlation with Private consumption 0.71 1.00 0.02
Correlation with inflation 0.10 0.02 1.00
4 Estimation
The Bayesian estimations in this section are conducted using three observable variables for each of our
domestic economies in addition to the commodities index. All observables are directly mapped to variables
in the structural model using the following equations:
∆lnGobst = lnGt − lnGt−1 + Trendg (81)
∆lnCobst = lnCt − lnCt−1 + Trendc (82)
piobst = pit + Trend (83)
pobso,t = po,t (84)
The Bayesian estimations are conducted on our selected parameters using an MCMC algorithm to
obtain draws from the marginal posterior distribution of the parameters20. We estimate the stochastic
20 We take 1,000,000 draws with an acceptance rate of 32.4 for Chile, 34.2 for Saudi Arabia, 34.5 for Australia,
and 33.3 for South Africa. We also discard 25 percent of the draws and keep the remaining ones for inference.
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processes of each of the exogenous disturbances of the model, along with the parameter that governs
the response of government consumption to changes in the commodity prices φg and the parameter that
shows the effect of government consumption on private consumption χ, as shown in the below table. The
estimation of these two parameters, using the data, allows us to capture the size of these two parameters
within the framework of our model.
In this regard, we use the calibrated values for χ and φg as the prior values for those two parameters
while obtaining the values of the standard deviation from the regression results of this paper for φg. As for
χ, we used standard deviations that are equivalent to the standard deviations of the regression results in
percentage terms. Moreover, we impose a non-negativity assumption on χ by assuming an inverse gamma
prior distribution. As for φg, we assume a prior normal distribution in order to give the parameter the
freedom to move between negative and positive values. In addition, the prior values and the standard
deviations for the stochastic processes of all the shocks were taken from Smets and Wouters 2007. Also,
we impose the same prior values and standard deviations for all the shocks to have the same relative
importance for all the shocks at the starting point.
Table 6: Estimated Parameters
Parameter Prior Mean std. dev.
AUS
χ Inverse-Gamma 67.6 12.82
φg Normal -0.01 0.017
CHL
χ Inverse-Gamma 8.19 4.84
φg Normal 0.25 0.048
SA
χ Inverse-Gamma 5.3 2.266
φg Normal -0.04
KSA
χ Inverse-Gamma 102.4 19.42
φg Normal 0.78 0.14
ρi Beta 0.5 0.2
σi Inverse-Gamma 0.05 2
i = a, a∗, g∗, o, g, r, r∗
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Table 7: Historical Decomposition
KSA
Observed Variable a a∗ o∗ g g∗ r r∗
∆lnGobst 0.00% 18.86% 0.00% 67.32% 5.92% 0.00% 7.89%
∆lnCobst 0.00% 28.70% 0.00% 35.67% 12.61% 0.00% 23.03%
piobst 0.00% 44.97% 0.00% 3.10% 44.71% 0.00% 7.22%
CHL
Observed Variable a a∗ o∗ g g∗ r r∗
∆lnGobst 15.48% 0.85% 0.00% 57.37 % 0.00% 5.68% 20.63%
∆lnCobst 55.95% 0.23% 0.00% 0.21% 0.00% 40.54% 3.08%
piobst 13.35% 0.21% 0.00% 0.00 % 0.00% 85.85% 0.59%
AUS
Observed Variable a a∗ o∗ g g∗ r r∗
∆lnGobst 0.00% 3.35% 0.00% 94.67% 0.00% 0.04% 1.94%
∆lnCobst 0.00% 22.70% 0.00% 5.89% 0.01% 1.96% 69.44%
piobst 0.00% 26.93% 0.00% 0.27% 0.01% 53.66% 19.12%
SA
Observed Variable a a∗ o∗ g g∗ r r∗
∆lnGobst 2.25% 0.00% 0.00% 84.15% 0.00% 0.27% 13.33%
∆lnCobst 74.20% 0.00% 0.00% 0.20% 0.00% 17.74% 7.86%
piobst 20.40% 0.00% 0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 76.50% 3.09%
The estimation results (shown in Appendix C.5) indicate no significant change in the elasticity of
substitution between government consumption and private consumption χ for each of the four economies
from the baseline calibrated values. These results support the literature that shows the crowding in effect
of government consumption on private consumption in our selected economies. As for the response of
government consumption to changes in the commodity index φg, the response of the Australian government
consumption is in line with the baseline calibrations, indicating a countercyclical fiscal stance. As for the
Chilean government consumption, the results show a significant drop in φg, contradicting the results
shown in Table (4) but supporting the SVAR impulse responses and are backed by the adopted fiscal rule
by the Chilean government. The results for φg of the South African economy indicate a change in the
response from a negative value of -0.04 to a positive response of 0.032, which is also in line with the SVAR
impulse responses, and indicating a procyclical fiscal stance by the South African government. Lastly, the
response of φg in the Saudi economy is reduced to 0.13, but it is not robust for changes in the standard
deviation, and it is biased towards increasing whenever the standard deviation is increased. Overall, the
posterior densities are considerably different from the loose priors that we choose, implying that the data
is informative regarding this estimated parameter. As a robustness check, we re-estimate the model while
increasing the standard deviations of the structural parameters by 50 %. The robustness checks show that
the values of the structural parameters for all four economies are not sensitive to these changes in the
standard deviations. The only exception to this, as noted above, is the response of the Saudi government
consumption to changes in the commodity price index. The response increased from 0.13 to 0.22, which is
still the highest among the government response of all selected economies.
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The above results, which are based on an infinite horizon forecast-error variance decomposition, show
some results which are worth highlighting. First, the results show no role for shocks in the supply of
commodities on any of the domestic variables across all four economies. This is also shown in the posterior
estimation of the standard deviations of the supply of commodities across all economies (see Appendix
C.5). Second, domestic interest rates explain the behaviour of all the domestic variables except in the
Saudi economy. This is apparently a result of the policy crowding-out effect of fiscal policy on monetary
policy and explains the adoption of an exchange rate peg regime by the monetary authorities in Saudi
Arabia. In the other three economies, interest rates explain a significant percentage of domestic CPI
inflation, showing an indication of an active monetary policy stance in these economies. Third, foreign
government consumption has no effect on all economies except for the Saudi economy in this case as
well, where foreign government consumption has a significant effect on all of the domestic variables of
the Saudi economy. Lastly, the behaviour of private consumption and CPI inflation in Saudi Arabia are
mostly explained by external shocks, unlike the two variables in Chile and South Africa which are mainly
explained by domestic factors. The behaviour of those two variables in Australia, on the other hand, shows
dominance in the effect of external shocks. Nevertheless, the Australian economy, unlike its counterparts,
has a well-developed financial market which makes it more linked to the rest of the world economy.
5 Conclusion
The previous literature on commodity-rich economies has always assumed that this group of countries
was homogeneous and that the only source of heterogeneity among those countries comes from the dif-
ference in the volatility of the prices of commodities. This paper sought to investigate the heterogeneity
among commodity-rich countries beyond the prices of commodities. We achieved this by imposing the
same commodity-price index on four economies which are rich with different types of commodities. We
build a model that nests different sources of shocks that were proposed in the previous literature and add
a central role for commodities in the model. Our model allows for a quadruple role for commodities. First,
the domestic government collects the windfalls of selling commodities to the rest of the world. Second,
commodities are consumed by households both in the domestic economy and the foreign economy. Third,
firms both in the domestic economy and the foreign economy use commodities as an input in their produc-
tion. Lastly, the domestic economy is affected by the second-round effect of an increase in the commodity
prices in the form of high foreign inflation and low world demand. Government consumption is included
in the utility function as a complement to private consumption in a non-separable form. This results
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in comovement between government consumption and private consumption and it generates volatility in
private consumption which is qualitatively similar to the one shown in the data.
We focus on two key behavioural parameters in the model: the elasticity of substitution between
government consumption and private consumption and the response of government consumption to changes
in the prices of commodities. Our results show that government consumption in all four economies has
a crowding in effect on private consumption with differing degrees of complementarity. These results
support the findings of Bouakez and Rebei 2007 and Gali et al. 2007 who show similar results to ours. In
addition, the crowding in effect of government consumption on private consumption affects the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy and leads to a policy crowding out effect of fiscal policy towards monetary
policy, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, which might be an explanation to the adoption of an exchange rate
peg regime in Saudi Arabia and the majority of oil-rich countries. The response of government consumption
to changes in commodity prices, on the other hand, was an indication of two essential factors. The first
one is the fiscal stance of government consumption (Institutional factors), while the second one is the size
of natural resources rents in the domestic economy. The latter shows discrepancy across commodity-rich
countries. The data (shown in Appendix C.3) and our estimations show that, given the significantly larger
share of oil rents relative to other commodities, oil-rich countries are more vulnerable to external shocks.
The model is estimated using Australian, Chilean, Saudi and South African data from 1980 to 2015.
Doing so allows us to evaluate the contribution of different sources of shock in the behaviour of the model’s
three domestic variables over a time horizon. The results show that our key variables in Saudi Arabia,
an oil-rich country, were more vulnerable to developments in the foreign economy than its developing
counterparts, namely Chile and South Africa, which, as highlighted above, explains the adoption of an
exchange rate peg regime in most oil-rich countries. The macro variables in Australia also appeared to be
affected by developments in the foreign economy, but this is mainly attributed to its developed financial
sector which is highly linked to the rest of the world economy. Nevertheless, Australia, despite being a
developed country, showed higher fluctuations in private consumption relative to output, a characteristic
which is normally assigned to developing and emerging economies.
The results of the paper clearly illustrate that the proposed solutions for commodity-rich economies
by various papers in the literature, which are based on a "quintessential" single economy, should be read
with caution.
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Appendices
Appendix C.1
- Domestic economy
• Optimal consumption bundles:
cZ,t = ct −mu ∗ pZ,t (85)
cO,t = ct −mu ∗ pO,t (86)
cH,t = cZ,t −mu ∗ (pH,t − pZ,t) (87)
cF,t = ct −mu ∗ (pF,t − pZ,t) (88)
• Relative prices and inflation rates:
0 = (1−$) ∗ pZ,t +$ ∗ pO,t (89)
pZ,t = (1− α) ∗ pH,t + α ∗ pF,t (90)
piZ,t = pZ,t − pZ,t−1 + pit (91)
piH,t = pH,t − pH,t−1 + pit (92)
piF,t = pF,t − pF,t−1 + pit (93)
• Labour supply:
Real wages = σ ∗ ct + ϕ ∗ nt + (σ − σδ) ∗ gt (94)
• IS curve:
xt = Et{xt+1} − ωα
σδ
(rt − Et{pit+1} − r¯rt) (95)
• Phillips curve
piH,t = βEt{piH,t+1}+ κνϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν)
ωα(1 + ϕ(1− ν)) xt (96)
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• Natural rate of interest:
r¯rt =− ν(1 + ϕ)σδ(1− ρa))
νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν)at +
(1− ν)(1 + ϕ)σδ
νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν)∆Et{p˜
∗
o,t+1}
+ νϕ(1− α)(σ − σδ)
νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν)∆Et{gt+1}+
(σ − σδ)(νωα(αϕ− σα) + σδ(1 + ϕ− ϕν))
ωα(νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν)) ∆Et{g
∗
t+1}
+ σδ((1 + α)σδ(1 + ϕ(1− ν))− ανϕωα(ω − 1)− αωσδ(1 + ϕ(1− ν))− νωασδ)
ωα(νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν)) ∆Et{y
∗
t+1}
(97)
• Flexible-price output:
y¯t = −νσδωα − σδ − σδϕ(1− ν)
νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν) y
∗
t − ((σ − σδ)(νωα − (1− α)− (1− α)ϕ(1− ν))
νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν) g
∗
t
− (1− α)(σ − σδ)(1 + ϕ(1− ν))
νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν) gt +
ν(1 + ϕ)ωα
νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν)at −
(1− ν)(1 + ϕ)ωα
νϕωα + σδ + σδϕ(1− ν) p˜
∗
o,t
(98)
• Output gap:
xt = yt − y¯t. (99)
• Production function:
yt = νat + νnt + (1− ν)od (100)
• Domestic commodity demand:
odt =
1 + ϕ
1 + ϕ(1− ν)yt+
νσδ
1 + ϕ(1− ν)y
∗
t − ν(1 + ϕ)1 + ϕ(1− ν)at+
ν(σ − σδ)
1 + ϕ(1− ν)g
∗
t − ν1 + ϕ(1− ν) p˜
∗
o,t (101)
• Monetary policy:
rt = ρrrt−1 + φpipiZ,t + φyxt + t (102)
• Fiscal policy
gt = ρggt−1 + φg ∗ (pO) + g (103)
- Rest of the world
• Optimal consumption bundles:
c∗Z,t = c∗t −mu∗ ∗ p∗Z,t (104)
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c∗O,t = c∗t −mu∗ ∗ p∗O,t (105)
• Relative prices and inflation rates:
0 = (1−$∗) ∗ p∗Z,t +$∗ ∗ p∗O,t (106)
pi∗Z,t = p∗Z,t − p∗Z,t−1 + pi∗t (107)
• Labour supply:
Real wages = σ ∗ c∗t + ϕ ∗ n∗t + (σ − σδ) ∗ g∗t (108)
• IS curve:
x∗t = Et{x∗t+1} − 1
σδ
[r∗t − Et{pi∗t+1} − r¯r∗t ] (109)
• Natural rate of interest:
r¯r∗t = −σδ(1− ρa)(1 + ϕ)ν
ν(ϕ+ σ) a
∗
t +
ν(σ − σδ)(σ + ϕ− σδ)
ν(ϕ+ σ) ∆g
∗
t+1 − σδ(1− ν)(1 + ϕ)
ν(ϕ+ σ) ∆p˜
∗
o,t+1 (110)
• Phillips curve
pˆi∗t = βEt[pˆi∗t+1] + λ
νσ + νϕ
1 + (1− ν)ϕx
∗
t (111)
• Flexible-price output:
y¯t
∗ = −1 + (1− ν)ϕ
νσ + νϕ µ
∗ + ν(1 + ϕ)
νσ + νϕ a
∗
t − (1− ν)(1 + ϕ)
νσ + νϕ p˜
∗
o,t − ν(σ − σδ)
νσ + νϕ g
∗
t (112)
• Output gap:
x∗t = y∗t − y¯t∗ (113)
• Production function:
y∗t = νa∗t + νn∗t + (1− ν)o∗d (114)
• Market clearing condition
y∗t = c∗Z,t (115)
• World commodity demand:
o∗dt =
νσ + ϕ+ 1
1 + ϕ(1− ν)y
∗
t − ν(1 + ϕ)1 + ϕ(1− ν)a
∗
t +
ν(σ − σδ)
1 + ϕ(1− ν)g
∗
t − ν1 + ϕ(1− ν) p˜
∗
o,t (116)
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• Real commodity prices:
p˜∗o,t =
νσ + ϕ+ 1
ν
y∗t − (1 + ϕ)a∗t + (σ − σδ)g∗t − 1 + ϕ(1− ν)
ν
o∗st (117)
• Monetary policy:
r∗t = ρrr∗t−1 + φpipi∗t + φyx∗t + r∗,t (118)
- International linkages
• Goods market clearing:
yt = (1− α)ct + αc∗t + α[γ + η(1− α)]st (119)
• Domestic output as a function of world output and the terms of trade
yt = y∗t +
(1− α)(σ − σδ)
σδ
(g∗t − gt) + ωα
σδ
st (120)
• Real exchange rate:
qt = (1− α)st. (121)
- Exogenous processes:
at = ρaat−1 + a,t (122)
a∗t = ρaa∗t−1 + a∗,t (123)
o∗t = ρoo∗t−1 + o∗,t (124)
g∗t = ρg∗g∗t−1 + g∗,t (125)
- Measurement equations:
dgobst = gt − gt−1 + Trendg (126)
dcobst = ct − ct−1 + Trendc (127)
piobst = pit + Trend (128)
pobso,t = po,t (129)
48
Appendix C.2
To understand the inflation dynamics in the model, we start by analysing the price-setting behaviour of
firms. We follow the steps of Galí and Monacelli 2005, and the 3rd chapter of Gali 2008 to derive the
price-setting behaviour of firms in the model under a sticky prices framework. The aggregate domestic
price index in the model is a weighted average of prices that have been adjusted at period t and prices
that have not been adjusted:
PH,t =
[
θ(PH,t−1)1− + (1− θ)(P¯H,t)1−
] 1
1− (130)
P¯H,t is the re-optimised price that a fraction of the firms (1 − θ) choose at period t, and this is normally
higher than the prevailing price during the last period before. Pt−1 is the price imposed by the other
fraction of firms who have not been able to adjust their prices, and this is why we keep last period’s prices
as the prevailing prices for those firms. We divide the above equation by PH,t−1 to get:
Π1−H,t = θ + (1− θ)
(
P¯H,t
PH,t−1
)1−
(131)
Log-linearising the above equation around a steady state with zero inflation yields21
piH,t = (1− θ)(p¯H,t − pH,t−1) (132)
In the above equation, inflation at the current period is affected by the price adjustment that a fraction
of the firms in the economy make to their prices. Therefore, as mentioned above, we start deriving the
price-setting behaviour of firms to capture the dynamics of prices in the economy. When firms set their
prices according to Calvo 1983 contract scheme, they aim to maximise the expected discounted value of
their profits under the assumption that the newly set price will still be effective:
maxP¯H,t
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{
Qt,t+k[cjt+k|t(P¯H,t −Ψt+k)]
}
(133)
Ψ is the cost function, θk is the probability that the re-optimised price at period t will remain effective at
period t+k, and Qt,t+k is a the discount factor of nominal pay off and it is defined in equation (9). cjt+k|t
is the Expected demand/production for period t+k at period t. The equation is subject to the following
demand constraint: cjt+k =
(
P¯t
Pt+k
)−
Ct. Plugging in the demand function into the firm’s maximisation
21Log-linearising around a steady state of zero inflation allows us to get rid of the price dispersion created by the
nominal friction in the model.
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problem yields:
maxP¯H,t
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{
Qt,t+k[
(
P¯H,t
Pt+k
)−
Ct+k(P¯t −Ψt+k)]
}
(134)
Taking the first order condition of the above equation yields:
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{
Qt,t+kCt+k[P¯H,t −Mψt+k|t]} = 0 (135)
ψ is the nominal marginal cost, and M is the gross mark-up and its equal to 
−1 . Now, we divide the
above equation by PH,t−1 and divide and multiply the second term by PH,t+k:
∞∑
k=0
θkEt
{
Qt,t+kCt+k
[
P¯H,t
PH,t−1
−MMCt+k|tΠHt−1,t+k
]}
= 0 (136)
Where ΠHt−1,t+k =
PH,t+k
PH,t−1
, and MCt+k|t =
ψt+k|t
PH,t+k
. We log-linearise the above equation around a zero-
inflation steady state. Noting that Qt,t+k in the steady state will equal βk:
p¯H,t − pH,t−1 = (1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt{mct+k|t + µ+ (pH,t+k − pH,t−1)} (137)
We notice from the above equation that the firms discount the expected stream of their future profits using
the household’s discount factor. This is simply attributed to the fact that the households are the share
holders of those firms. Rearranging the above equation gives:
p¯H,t = µ+ (1− βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)kEt{mct+k|t + pH,t+k} (138)
The above equation is describing how firm set their prices with a certain mark-up and the discounted
present value of the stream of marginal costs. In the case when θ = 0 all firms will be able to adjust their
prices in each period (flexible prices scheme), and the above equation will simplify to:
p¯H,t = µ+mct (139)
The price the firms set in this case is equal to their markup over the nominal marginal cost. Of course,
this shows that the price set by the firms is above their marginal cost since the markup is greater than
1. As a result, output will be lower than its level under perfect competition. It will be shown how the
government can offset this distortion by giving the firms a certain employment subsidy. Now going back
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to equation (137), if we rewrite down the equation in a compact form we get:
p¯H,t − pH,t−1 = βθEt{pH,t+1 − pH,t}+ pit + (1− βθ)mˆct (140)
Where mˆct = mct − pH,t + µ. Adding the above equation to the price setting equation gives us:
piH,t = βEt{piH,t+1}+ κmˆct (141)
Where κ = (1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ
. The above equation is the core New Keynesian Phillips Curve. We develop it
in the text to link inflation to the output gap through the relationship between the mˆc and the output gap
xt. κ in the Phillips curve equation is strictly decreasing in the stickiness parameter θ. From the above
equation, we see that inflation in this type of models is a result of aggregate price-setting of the firms who
adjust their prices based on current and future stream of their marginal costs.
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Appendix C.3
Table 8: Averages of Natural Resources Rents During 1980-2015
Country Dominant Resource Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP) Country Dominant Resource Natural Resources Rents (% of GDP)
Albania Oil 4.44 Madagascar Forests 6.15
Algeria Oil 14.9 Malawi Forests 8.27
Angola Oil 38.64 Malaysia Forests and Oil 15.4
Australia Minerals 4.49 Mali Forests 6.78
Bahrain Forests 6.53 Mauritania Minerals 19.43
Benin Forests 6.53 Mongolia Coal and Minerals 14.93
Botswana Minerals 3.09 Mozambique Forests 10.41
Brunei Darussalam Oil 23.47 Myanmar Forests 8.07
Burkina Faso Forests and Minerals 10.06 Namibia Minerals 4.3
Burundi Forests 18.45 Niger Forests 8.61
Cambodia Forests 3.76 Nigeria Oil 28.58
Cameroon Forests and Oil 9.36 Norway Oil 7.16
Canada Oil 3.52 Oman Oil 34.7
Central Africa Forests 9.69 Papa New Guinea Minerals 29.21
Chad Forests and Oil 16.16 Qatar Natural Gas and Oil 27.5
Chile Minerals 10.86 Republic of Congo Oil 41.37
China Coal and Oil 5.93 Russia Natural Gas and Oil 13.3
Comoros Forests 2.18 Rwanda Forests 7.34
Dem. Congo Forests and Minerals 24.19 Senegal Forests 3.43
Egypt Oil 11.2 Sierra Leone Forests 14.29
Equatorial Guinea Oil 11.2 Solomon Islands Forests and Minerals 11.26
Eritrea Forests 5.59 South Africa Coal and Minerals 6.25
Ethiopia Forests 17.94 South Sudan Oil 32.77
Gabon Oil 31.34 Sudan Oil 5.51
Gambia Forests 3.83 Suriname Minerals 14.56
Ghana Forests and Oil 10.19 Swaziland Forests 5.32
Guinea Forests and Minerals 20.01 Syria Oil 16.7
Guinea-Bissau Forests 18.55 Tanzania Forests 8.05
Guyana Forests and Minerals 20.5 Togo Forests and Minerals 11.58
India Coal and Oil 3.16 Trinidad and Tobago Oil 13.02
Indonesia Oil 8.62 Tunisia Oil 5.38
Iran Oil 19.44 Turkmenistan Natural Gas 41.1
Iraq Oil 32.3 UAE Oil 19.7
Ivory Coast Forests 5.02 Uganda Forests 16.6
Jamaica Minerals 4.12 Ukraine Minerals 4.39
Kazakhstan Oil 15.98 Uzbekistan Natural Gas 14.66
Kenya Forests 4.21 Venezuela Oil 15.67
Kuwait Oil 38.8 Vietnam Forests and Oil 7.04
Kyrgyzstan Minerals 3.98 Yemen Oil 25.2
Lao Forests and Minerals 9.03 Zambia Minerals 12.83
Lesotho Forests 4.98 Zimbabwe Coal and Minerals 7.45
Liberia Forests and Minerals 40.98 KSA Oil 34.8
Libya Oil 39.08
Macedonia Minerals 2.19
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Appendix 4
Table 9: Baseline Calibration
Fixed Value
β Discount factor 0.99
δ share of private consumption in the aggregate consumption bundle 0.95
 Elasticity of substitution 6
η elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods 1
γ Elasticity of substitution between goods in the world economy 1
ν Share of non-commodity factors in the production function 0.95
σ Inverse elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1
ϕ&ϕ∗ Inverse Frisch labour supply elasticity 3
µ Elasticity of substitution between commodity and core consumption 0.3
θ Calvo probability 0.75
φpi Inflation elasticity of the nominal interest rate 1.5
φx Output gap elasticity of the nominal interest rate 0.5
ρa,a∗ AR(1) coefficient of domestic and foreign productivity 0.66
ρr,r∗ AR(1) coefficient of domestic and foreign interest rates 0.12
σa,a∗ standard deviation of a domestic and foreign productivity shocks 0.0071
σr,r∗ standard deviation of a domestic and foreign interest rates shocks 0.24
Calibrated
α Degree of openness in the domestic economy
CHL 28.6
AUS 19.2
SA 25.0
KSA 31.7
$ share of consumption of commodities in the consumption basket of the domestic economy
CHL 8.7
AUS 7.2
SA 7.9
KSA 2.2
$∗ share of consumption of commodities in the consumption basket of the foreign economy 8.8
χ inverse elasticity of substitution between C&G in the domestic economy
CHL 8.19
AUS 67.6
SA 5.3
KSA 102.4
χ∗ inverse elasticity of substitution between C&G in the foreign economy 7.25
φg response of domestic government consumption to changes in commodity prices
CHL 0.25
AUS -0.01
SA -0.04
KSA 0.78
ρo AR(1) coefficient of aggregate commodity supply 0.376
ρg AR(1) coefficient of domestic government consumption
CHL 0.44
AUS 0.58
SA 0.35
KSA 0.12
ρg∗ AR(1) coefficient of foreign government consumption 0.59
σo standard deviation of an aggregate commodity supply shock 0.0166
σg standard deviation of domestic government consumption
CHL 0.0286
AUS 0.0122
SA 0.0256
KSA 0.1002
σg∗ standard deviation of foreign government consumption 0.0168
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Figure 5: Impulse Response Functions in the Australian
(a) Domestic technology shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(b) Foreign technology shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(c) Domestic government shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(d) Foreign government shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(e) Domestic interest rates shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(f) Foreign interest rates shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(g) World commodity supply shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
Note: all seven shocks are normalised to 1.
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Figure 6: Impulse Response Functions in the Chilean Economy
(a) Domestic technology shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(b) Foreign technology shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(c) Domestic government shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(d) Foreign government shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(e) Domestic interest rates shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(f) Foreign interest rates shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(g) World commodity supply shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
Note: all seven shocks are normalised to 1.
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Figure 7: Impulse Response Functions in the Saudi Economy
(a) Domestic technology shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(b) Foreign technology shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(c) Domestic government shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(d) Foreign government shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(e) Domestic interest rates shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(f) Foreign interest rates shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(g) World commodity supply shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
Note: all seven shocks are normalised to 1.
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Figure 8: Impulse Response Functions in the South African Economy
(a) Domestic technology shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(b) Foreign technology shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(c) Domestic government shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(d) Foreign government shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(e) Domestic interest rates shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(f) Foreign interest rates shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
(g) World commodity supply shock
Commodity prices Gov. Cons P. Consumption CPI Inflation
Note: all seven shocks are normalised to 1.
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Appendix C.5
- Saudi Arabia
Table 10: KSA Estimation Output
Prior Mean Posterior Mean Posterior Mode 90% HPD Interval Prior Prior. Stdev
Parameter
ρa 0.5 0.4957 0.5 0.1680-0.8196 Beta 0.2
ρa∗ 0.5 0.6123 0.6213 0.5439-0.6809 Beta 0.2
ρr 0.5 0.977 0.9851 0.9590-0.9969 Beta 0.2
ρr∗ 0.5 0.6478 0.7121 0.4002-0.9132 Beta 0.2
ρg 0.5 0.8666 0.8841 0.7762-0.9596 Beta 0.2
ρg∗ 0.5 0.9345 0.9570 0.8792-0.9921 Beta 0.2
ρo∗ 0.5 0.5086 0.5 0.1835-0.8377 Beta 0.2
χ 102.4 102.6194 94.6648 72.4744-134.1410 inv-Gamma 19.42
φg 0.78 0.1994 0.1826 0.1128-0.2866 Normal 0.14
Standard deviations
a 0.05 0.0474 0.0230 0.0115-0.0879 inv-Gamma 2.0
a∗ 0.05 14.8362 14.1357 11.7893-17.8101 inv-Gamma 2.0
r 0.05 0.0476 0.0230 0.0114-0.0864 inv-Gamma 2.0
r∗ 0.05 9.8784 9.2001 7.7125-12.0271 inv-Gamma 2.0
g 0.05 9.9372 9.1847 7.6239-12.1326 inv-Gamma 2.0
g∗ 0.05 8.2126 7.9655 6.5845-9.7930 inv-Gamma 2.0
o∗ 0.05 0.0449 0.0230 0.0118-0.0826 inv-Gamma 2.0
Figure 9: Historical Decomposition of government consumption in KSA 1981-2015
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Figure 10: Historical Decomposition of private consumption in KSA 1981-2015
Figure 11: Historical Decomposition of inflation in KSA 1981-2015
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Australia
Table 11: AUS Estimation Output
Prior Mean Posterior Mean Posterior Mode 90% HPD Interval Prior Prior. Stdev
Parameter
ρa 0.5 0.4930 0.5000 0.1703-0.8199 Beta 0.2
ρa∗ 0.5 0.8371 0.8371 0.7444-0.9237 Beta 0.2
ρr 0.5 0.8765 0.9049 0.7822-0.9762 Beta 0.2
ρr∗ 0.5 0.6877 0.7603 0.4524-0.9400 Beta 0.2
ρg 0.5 0.9035 0.9136 0.8402-0.9724 Beta 0.2
ρg∗ 0.5 0.4949 0.5001 0.1701-0.8245 Beta 0.2
ρo∗ 0.5 0.5007 0.5000 0.1768-0.8298 Beta 0.2
χ 67.6 67.8278 62.4937 47.6358-87.3705 inv-Gamma 12.82
φg -0.01 -0.0122 -0.0124 -0.0206 - -0.0040 Normal 0.017
Standard deviations
a 0.05 0.0581 0.0230 0.0113-0.0973 inv-Gamma 2.0
a∗ 0.05 4.4787 4.3014 3.5909-5.3540 inv-Gamma 2.0
r 0.05 3.0546 2.8909 2.4017-3.6755 inv-Gamma 2.0
r∗ 0.05 8.7136 8.2294 6.9810-10.4489 inv-Gamma 2.0
g 0.05 1.1069 1.0447 0.8834-1.3229 inv-Gamma 2.0
g∗ 0.05 0.0589 0.0230 0.0111-0.0907 inv-Gamma 2.0
o∗ 0.05 0.0509 0.0230 0.0110-0.0899 inv-Gamma 2.0
Figure 12: Historical Decomposition of government consumption in Australia 1981-2015
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Figure 13: Historical Decomposition of private consumption in Australia 1981-2015
Figure 14: Historical Decomposition of inflation in Australia 1981-2015
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Chile
Table 12: CHL Estimation Output
Prior Mean Posterior Mean Posterior Mode 90% HPD Interval Prior Prior. Stdev
Parameter
ρa 0.5 0.6155 0.6466 0.4147-0.7960 Beta 0.2
ρa∗ 0.5 0.6640 0.9309 0.3015-0.9794 Beta 0.2
ρr 0.5 0.2166 0.0860 0.0078-0.4871 Beta 0.2
ρr∗ 0.5 0.6416 0.5141 0.3480-0.9520 Beta 0.2
ρg 0.5 0.7512 0.7493 0.6465-0.8582 Beta 0.2
ρg∗ 0.5 0.5157 0.5 0.1865-0.8364 Beta 0.2
ρo∗ 0.5 0.5062 0.5 0.1731-0.8238 Beta 0.2
χ 8.19 7.6746 5.5958 3.3082-12.1583 inv-Gamma 4.84
φg 0.25 0.0921 0.0750 0.0565-0.1261 Normal 0.048
Standard deviations
a 0.05 25.7249 22.4146 18.3701-33.3067 inv-Gamma 2.0
a∗ 0.05 1.8607 4.1777 0.0089-5.7465 inv-Gamma 2.0
r 0.05 24.4385 24.5309 19.2848-29.5408 inv-Gamma 2.0
r∗ 0.05 9.9686 5.5864 4.1676-15.2937 inv-Gamma 2.0
g 0.05 2.4501 2.2099 1.9075-2.9527 inv-Gamma 2.0
g∗ 0.05 0.0472 0.0230 0.0111-0.0923 inv-Gamma 2.0
o∗ 0.05 0.0466 0.0230 0.0118-0.0837 inv-Gamma 2.0
Figure 15: Historical Decomposition of government consumption in Chile 1981-2015
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Figure 16: Historical Decomposition of private consumption in Chile 1981-2015
Figure 17: Historical Decomposition of inflation in Chile 1981-2015
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South Africa
Table 13: SA Estimation Output
Prior Mean Posterior Mean Posterior Mode 90% HPD Interval Prior Prior. Stdev
Parameter
ρa 0.5 0.5689 0.5825 0.3897-0.7525 Beta 0.2
ρa∗ 0.5 0.4915 0.5 0.1543-0.8121 Beta 0.2
ρr 0.5 0.7647 0.7955 0.6015-0.9364 Beta 0.2
ρr∗ 0.5 0.7129 0.7835 0.4902-0.9498 Beta 0.2
ρg 0.5 0.8729 0.8773 0.8075-0.9433 Beta 0.2
ρg∗ 0.5 0.4987 0.5 0.1724-0.8253 Beta 0.2
ρo∗ 0.5 0.4967 0.5 0.1675-0.8263 Beta 0.2
χ 5.3 5.2948 4.0505 2.5256-8.1299 inv-Gamma 2.266
φg -0.04 0.0419 0.0415 0.0244-0.0597 Normal 0.08
Standard deviations
a 0.05 13.8192 13.2063 10.6822-16.8417 inv-Gamma 2.0
a∗ 0.05 0.0487 0.0230 0.0113-0.0881 inv-Gamma 2.0
r 0.05 7.3169 6.9333 5.7996-8.7983 inv-Gamma 2.0
r∗ 0.05 12.2104 11.5483 9.7760-14.5750 inv-Gamma 2.0
g 0.05 2.1457 2.0189 1.7181-2.5694 inv-Gamma 2.0
g∗ 0.05 0.0470 0.0230 0.0116-0.0870 inv-Gamma 2.0
o∗ 0.05 0.0455 0.0230 0.0113-0.0837 inv-Gamma 2.0
Figure 18: Historical Decomposition of government consumption in South Africa 1981-2015
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Figure 19: Historical Decomposition of private consumption in South Africa 1981-2015
Figure 20: Historical Decomposition of inflation in South Africa 1981-2015
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